In [8, 10] , we present an axiomatic justification for the fact that quantified beliefs should be represented by belief functions. We show that the mathematical function that can represent quantified beliefs should be a Choquet capacity monotone of order 2. In order to show that it must be monotone of order infinite, thus a belief function, we propose several extra rationality requirements. One of them is based on the negation of a belief function, a concept introduced by Dubois and Prade [2]. This concept was essentially abstract, and its applicability was neither established nor illustrated. Here we present an illustrative example of this negation process. This example gives ground to the use of belief functions to represent quantified beliefs.
Introduction
The use of any mathematical model to represent quantified beliefs, i.e., weighted opinions, can be supported either by defending convincing definitions with illustrative examples or by producing a set of axioms that justify it. For what concerns the models based on belief functions, examples illustrating the first approach can be found among others in [7, 4, 12, 11] whereas the second approach is developed in [15, 8, 10] ).
In any model for quantified beliefs, one considers an agent, the belief holder, called You hereafter, and a finite frame of discernment, denoted Ω. One of the worlds in Ω, denoted ω 0 , is the actual world, but, due to Your limited understanding, You cannot state which world is the actual one. All You can express is the strength of Your opinions, called hereafter beliefs, that ω 0 belongs to A for every A ⊆ Ω. We assume that this belief is represented by a pointwise measure defined on 2 Ω , the power set of Ω. This measure is temporarily denoted by Cr and called a 'credibility function'. So for every A ⊆ Ω, Cr(A) expresses (the strength of) Your belief that the actual world ω 0 belongs to A.
In [8, 10] , we produce sets of rationality requirements that should be satisfied by any credibility function and we prove 1) belief functions satisfy them, 2) probability functions, that are special cases of belief functions, are insufficiently expressive to represent degrees of belief and 3) Choquet capacities [1] , that are the generalization of belief functions, violate some of the requirements.
During the demonstration, we produce requirements from which we prove 1) the convexity of the set of credibility functions, 2) how credibility functions are adapted by uninformative modifications of the frame of discernment (refinement and coarsening), and 3) how they are revised by conditioning. At that level, we prove that Cr is a Choquet capacity monotone of order 2 [1] . To show that it is monotone of infinite order (i.e., a belief function), we propose several extra requirements. One of them is based on the negation of a belief function, a concept invented by Dubois and Prade [2] . It states: 'the negation of a credibility function is a credibility function'. In that case credibility functions are belief functions.
Unfortunately, this negation concept was only a mathematical property. To be used as a rationality requirement, one must produce at least one practical illustrative and convincing example where the negation is used.
In this paper, we present such an example. Thanks to it, our axiomatic justification presented in [8, 10] , is simplified.
Credibility functions
Let Cr represent Your belief over Ω, a finite frame of discernment. The only properties of Cr used in this paper are: The first requirement is quite strong as it eliminates models based on sets of probability functions [5, 6, 13] or on interval valued probabilities [14] . We accept the closed world assumption (Cr(Ω) = 1) in order to avoid useless discussions. The second requirement is assumed by any model of uncertainty and hardly questionable. The third requirement translates into the belief function framework the transformation achieved by a Markow matrix in classical probability theory. It satisfies quite natural requirements, and could almost be just assumed, what we do here. Proving that it is a necessary property will be presented in a forthcoming paper. That H * is a stochastic matrix can be deduced when Cr is a belief function. But as far as the purpose of this paper is to prove that Cr is a belief function, we can neither assume nor deduce it.
We present some needed background material (see [12, 11] ).
Notation convention
Cr
is the degree of belief given by You that the actual world belongs to B, which is a subset of Ω, Ev is a set of propositions (called the Evidential Corpus) and You accept as true the propositions deduced from those in Ev (Ev covers the classical conditioning event). The domain will be omitted when no confusion can occur.
The term between [ and ] is what You accept as true. In particular, it can be the conditioning event encountered in probability theory. Note that Your beliefs are based on what You accept as true, not on what is true. There is no necessity that what You accept as true is true, it might perfectly be false. Your beliefs would be 'unjustified', 'inadequate', 'erroneous', but so it is. Rationality is trying to accept only what is true, but this is only an ideal goal, and daily reality is far from that ideal.
By convention when we write Cr Ω [ω] for ω ∈ Ω, we mean that You accept as true that ω 0 ∈ ω and do not accept as true that ω 0 ∈ ω * for any ω * ⊂ ω (where ⊂ denotes strict subset). We will say that ω is 'all You accept as true'.
A credibility function can itself be part of the evidential corpus. For example, we write Cr Ω [ω, Cr Θ ] to mean that You accept as true both that ω 0 ∈ ω and that Your beliefs about Θ is represented by Cr Θ .
Doxastic equivalence and consistency
The next definition translates the idea that if two propositions are equivalent given what You know, the credibility functions they induce are equal. We then assume:
The Möbius transform
Let Cr Ω be a credibility function defined on Ω, its Möbius transform, denoted m Ω is defined as: 
Coarsening
Let Ω and Ω * be two frame of discernments where the elements of Ω * are the elements of a partition of Ω. For B ⊆ Ω, let Coars(B) denote the smallest subset of Ω * that contains B. We call Ω * an uninformative (it means 'just redefining the frame') coarsening of Ω. Given Cr Ω on Ω, Cr
It results from the doxastic consistency requirement. In that case,
All You accept as true
Let the frame of discernment Ω, and suppose all You accept as true is that ω 0 ∈ ω for an ω ⊆ Ω. For instance, why should any of them be better supported that it complement relative to ω? The concept of cardinality of the set ω cannot be used, as beliefs would otherwise violate the doxastic consistency requirement (see [10] ). Let β be that particular value. The term β cannot be negative as it is among others the belief given to the singletons of ω. If furthermore we require that beliefs can never be smaller than β, then β = 0 as for ω, Cr Ω [ω](ω) = 0. Finally, the beliefs given to any ω * is equal to the beliefs given to ω * ∩ω, as the worlds in ω * but not in ω * ∩ ω belong to ω and are thus accepted by You as impossible given You accept ω as true.
The next proposition express these ideas:
Proposition 2.2 The credibility function that represents Your beliefs given all You accept
as true is ω 0 ∈ ω is given by:
The Möbius transform of Cr Ω [ω] is given by: Proof. Let M be the operator (a matrix) that transforms any credibility function on Ω into its Möbius transforms [11] . M is not singular, so M −1 exists. Cr * = H * · Cr can be rewritten as Cr
The equation is just a rewriting of the matricial equality. P
In order to prove that Cr is a belief function, we must produce an example that shows that if some of the values of m are negative, there exists a H matrix such that some values of Cr * are negative. To produce such a matrix is mathematically trivial, but the challenge was to find a practical example that leads to such a matrix. This is what we achieve in the next section.
The Mischievous Killer
We consider here only the proof that the Möbius mass given to the Ω when |Ω| = 3 may not be negative. The case with 2 was proved in [10] . The real challenge was to go from 2 to 3. So we consider that case first.
Our example is based on a murder scenario, but could as well be rephrased as any diagnostic -detection problem.
The scenario
Suppose a murder has been committed by a single killer, denoted k 0 , and there are three suspects named A, B, and C. We denote by D 'anybody else'. So You know for sure that the killer k 0 ∈ Ω with Ω = {A, B, C, D}.
You collect a piece of evidence, a cigarette butt which brand, denoted θ 0 . The domain for θ 0 is Θ = {a, b, c, d}. The butt you observe can only be one of {a, b, c}. You look at the butt and build a belief Cr Θ about the actual value θ 0 .
The CB piece of evidence. You know the next piece of evidence, denoted CB for cigarette butt,
Using the doxastic consistency property, Cr Θ induces a credibility function Cr Ω [CB] about k 0 given by:
The F T piece of evidence. Now You learn for sure that if the killer was one of A, B, C, the killer would manage to create a false track. Cigarettes a, b and c can be recognized because, respectively, they have the letters XY , XZ and Y Z written on them. The killer will purposely drop a butt that points to the other suspects and surely not to him. For example, if the killer was A, A would have managed to let a butt with XZ or Y Z or Z written on it, the last case corresponding to the case where A has erased the missing letter. In the three cases, the butt does not point to A.
What D would do is unknown to You. Let W be the predicate 'You accept as true that exactly . . . is written on the butt', so W (Z) means that 'You accept as true that exactly Z is written on the butt' (and thus nothing more, what means in fact that the butt is either a b or a c butt). This information can be written as:
We write W () to express that nothing is written on the butt. The proposition
and similarly with the other two consequences.
The three rules can be rewritten as • before revision on F T , Your beliefs were represented by The same holds up to a permutation with a and b (see Table 1 ). 
